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The Quant Crisis of 2018-2020: Cornered by Big Growth: summary and key takeaways

The paper studies equity factor portfolios across the June 2018 to August 2020 Quant Crisis. Almost all gains were found in the biggest, priciest growth names, while smaller stocks lagged everywhere. Past value drawdowns were mostly momentum rallies, so this one hit multi-factor managers harder.

Blitz, D. · 2021 · The Journal of Portfolio ManagementSummary updated 20 November 2026
Published2021Journal article
Asset focusEquitiesQuant drawdowns
TypeResearchQuant Crises & Methods
Reading time4 minthis summary

The Quant Crisis of 2018-2020: Cornered by Big Growth at a glance

The question
Why did multi-factor equity strategies fail so broadly in 2018-2020, and how does that episode differ from earlier value drawdowns and quant crises?
Dataset & period
Kenneth French data library: global developed markets (base case) and US data where global data is unavailable. Factors SMB, HML, CMA, RMW and WML plus 5x5 sorted portfolios (100 portfolios) and 2x4x4 triple sorts. Crisis window: 27 months, June 2018 to August 2020. US long-term reference: July 1963 to May 2018. Drawdown comparison covers major value drawdowns since 1963. Monthly, cap-weighted, USD total returns.
Method
The author defines the crisis window and tracks standard Fama-French factors, then looks at 5x5 portfolios sorted on size and a second characteristic (value, investment, profitability, momentum, beta). Market-relative returns in the crisis are compared with long-run averages. A constrained regression matches mega-cap profitability and momentum portfolios to the five mega-cap value-sorted portfolios. The same lens is then applied to four earlier value drawdowns and to the 2009 quant crisis.

Key findings of The Quant Crisis of 2018-2020: Cornered by Big Growth

  • The paper dates the crisis to a 27-month window from June 2018 to August 2020, chosen as the span of broad factor underperformance.
  • In the 5x5 sorted portfolios, 85 of 100 lagged the market, and 70 of those lagged by double digits. This is nearly the reverse of the long-run pattern, where 72 of 100 had positive market-relative returns before the crisis.
  • The very largest, most expensive stocks beat the market by 53.8%, and that corner of the size/value table was the main pocket of outperformance.
  • The top-profitability and top-momentum mega-cap portfolios moved almost in step with mega-cap growth (monthly correlations of 75% and 89% in market-relative terms). A regression attributed most of their behaviour to mega-cap growth. The maximum Sharpe ratio portfolio for the window was entirely mega-cap growth, with nothing allocated to the other 99 portfolios.
  • In the size/value/profitability triple sort, the weakest-profitability large growth bucket had the strongest result at 83.6%. High profitability only paid when combined with expensive valuations.
  • Earlier value drawdowns were mostly momentum rallies, with momentum gains matching or beating the value losses. The 1989-1991 episode is the nearest analogue, though momentum worked in other size segments then. The 2009 crisis came from a momentum crash and ended in under half a year.

Robustness, as reported in the paper

  • The paper says results do not change materially if the crisis end date is moved one or two months later.
  • The paper checks the low-risk (beta) factor with size/beta sorts and finds low beta beat high beta within each size group, yet only some mega-cap buckets beat the market.
  • The same framework is applied to four earlier value drawdowns and to the 2009 crisis for comparison.

Caveats and limits

  • The crisis dating is described as somewhat ambiguous, and the paper was written in December 2020 when it was unclear whether the value recovery would last.
  • The factor portfolios are hypothetical, cap-weighted and use no transaction costs or implementation frictions (inferred).
  • Several analyses use US data only because global data are not available, and the drawdown list was identified manually from a handful of episodes (inferred).
  • The analysis is descriptive and ex post. It explains what worked in one window rather than testing a forecasting rule (inferred).

Items marked (inferred) are our reading of the design, not statements by the authors.

Why it matters

The paper shows that diversifying across factors did not protect when size, value and growth exposures lined up against smaller-cap tilts. Long-only quant managers who underweight mega-caps for active share faced a structural headwind. It also frames factor losses as dependent on which factor dominates the market, which matters for stress testing.

Questions about this paper

What was the only way to outperform during the Quant Crisis?

According to the paper, it was holding the largest and most expensive growth stocks, either directly or through factors that implicitly loaded on them. Other factors helped only through that exposure.

How did the 2018-2020 episode differ from earlier value drawdowns?

Earlier drawdowns were mostly momentum rallies where momentum offset value losses, and small stocks often still offered outperformance. In 2018-2020 momentum did not offset value and small stocks lagged broadly.

Did the paper conclude factor premiums had disappeared?

No. The author says the episode falls within the range of conceivable outcomes and does not imply a structural break.

Where can I read the original paper?

The original is at its publisher: https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2021.1.232. We link to the paper and do not host the PDF.

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